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'The exercise of governance authority by international organisations: The role of due 
diligence obligations after conflict' 
Abstract 
International legal scholarship largely ignores due diligence, yet its obligations do subsist. The 
Alabama Arbitration, the evolution of international economic, human rights and humanitarian 
law are all concerned with due diligence. During post-conflict transitions when international 
organisations hold governance roles normally associated with states the necessity of 
understanding the institution’s due diligence obligations becomes more apparent. In examining 
due diligence this article shines a light an important aspect of the operational role of law in 
regulating international organisations during transition when the duality of governance can cause 
legal obligations to become indistinct. 
Key words: due diligence, IGOs, omissions, positive obligations post-conflict 
International legal scholarship largely ignores due diligence, nonetheless it continues to create 
obligations. 1  The Alabama Arbitration, the evolution of economic law, the development of 
international human rights law and aspects of international humanitarian law all concern standards 
of due diligence.2 Critically, during times of transition, when international organisations (IGO) adopt 
roles normally associated with state authority, the necessity of understanding an institution’s due 
diligence obligations becomes ever more vital. During post-conflict periods IGO's must be both 
proactive and reactive, taking upon themselves international human rights, humanitarian, economic 
law obligations. This chapter questions the utility of due diligence in post-conflict periods and 
considers IGOs commitment to its inculcation into their activities.  
While a settled definition remains absent due diligence becomes operative upon the assumption of 
effective control over territory or populations coupled with the degree of predictability of harm 
alongside the importance of the interest to be protected.3 It includes the imperative to assess harm 
and risk, obligations to notify and consult, prevention and protection, a duty to investigate as well as 
reparations or restitution when harm occurs.4 Particularly with regard to IGOs but also due to 
inadequacies within substantive due diligence, ambiguity as to its content and practice emerged that 
lead to failures in carrying out aspects of its obligations. As this article discusses, this failure is 
particularly problematic post-conflict regarding to IGOs. Even so, these gaps also demonstrate where 
                                                          
1
 For an early outline see Amos S. Hershey, The Essentials of International Public Law and Organization 
(MacMillan, 1927) 254 
2
 Corfu Channel Case (UK v Albania) (Merits) [1949] ICJ Rep 4, Alabama Claims Arbitration (United States/Great 
Britain) (1872) 29 RIAA 125, some admirable exceptions of course exist and largely fall into the categories of 
environmental law, state responsibility and gender, Carin Benninger-Budel (ed) Due Diligence and its 
Application to Prevent Violence Against Women (Martinus Nijhoff 2008), Jan Arno Hessbruegge 'The Historical 
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3
 ILA Study Group on Due Diligence in International Law, available at http://www.ila-
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4
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due diligence, without the creation or re-naming of entirely new bodies of law, could be put to good 
use in situations where the legitimacy of constituted power is contested.  
Extensive governance roles for IGOs occur where peacekeeping is matched with broader constituted 
authority or what is termed as territorial administration. Albeit, the blurred character of governance 
in such circumstances makes clear categorisations difficult.5 Ratner argues given the large military 
presences involved in IGO governance 'the cognitive dissonance' between occupation and 
administration becomes unclear.6 Such dissonance opens a gap where due diligence could ensure 
legal protection continues. Kosovo stands as an obvious example of IGO governmental authority, but, 
even in circumstances of less apparent control, levels of constituted authority are exercised. Such 
governance evolved alongside the evolution of multilateralism and its inception is contemporaneous 
with the creation of the League of Nations. The administration of territory, be it in the inter-war 
period in Danzig7 or the Saar Basin,8 post World War II Berlin or Vienna, or the intended plans for 
Jerusalem,9 Trieste between 1947 and 195410, Irian Jaya,11 or Eritrea, failed to establish single 
structures. Despite the quite extensive heritage (particularly the number of persons subject to such 
governance) organisational accountability remains 'lite-touch' and clear due diligence steps narrowly 
construed.12  
As states become but one amongst a plethora of global actors engaged in post-conflict 
administration questions of constituted authority will abound. Broader questions regarding the 
nature of IGO administration, including its legitimacy, fall into the quagmire of semi-recognised 
states. Due to their non or partial recognition within international law, such territories participation 
in the creation of customary international law or within decision-making processes is doubtful, thus 
they do not partake in the processes of legitimatising actions that create IGO administration. Indeed, 
the temporal and bordered character of these administration systems create issues for IGO-led 
governance that some liken to colonialism.13  
Chesterman asks '[i]s it possible to establish conditions for legitimate and sustainable governance 
through a period of benevolent foreign autocracy? If it is possible to answer this in the positive the 
question becomes whether due diligence aids in achieving such legitimacy?'14 Whilst this article 
examines the specific role of IGOs post-conflict it recognises a duality where states' governance also 
subsists. When IGOs insist on international humanitarian, human rights or economic standards 
                                                          
5
 See for example, Simon Chesterman, You, the People: The United Nations, Transitional Administration, and 
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6
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rested on due diligence be part of the new state order, but without applying the same to their own 
operation, they create a space where legal obligations can be sidestepped.15 While some of the 
difficulty lies in treaties largely creating state obligations the degree to which international 
humanitarian and human rights law is customary international law requires all public (and some 
private) actors to comply.16 This chapter draws attention to a particularly useful way of examining 
the role of IGOs in situations which continuously cause difficulty for those seeking such organisations 
to be more reflective and accountable in their exercise of governance authority.  
Even as the overarching question of legitimacy remains the most critical this piece asks whether 
there is a standard by which to adjudge the actions of IGOs and if due diligence establishes a fulcrum 
around which resources can be allocated, where IGOs are required to plan ahead, to anticipate 
issues likely to arise in post-conflict situations and out of their intervention as well as reacting when 
unanticipated problems arise. This chapter asks what positive obligations are due during transition, 
are these similar or perhaps higher than those obligations during ‘peace.’ It asks whether the due 
diligence obligations associated with states regarding international humanitarian law, human rights 
and economic law transfer to the other actors exercising governance during transition. Further, it 
questions whether the absence of IGO due diligence forms a basis for states in transition to abandon 
a paradigm where their obligations outweigh that of other actors. This leads to a critical appraisal of 
the utility or otherwise of invoking due diligence when understanding governance post-conflict.  
The Character of Due Diligence 
Due diligence throws up some of the classic tropes of international law, from Grotius to Lotus, from 
Alabama Arbitration to the Nicaragua Case. Thus, it remains surprising that it has not met with more 
concerted analysis.17 With Grotius making use of the term as a form of accountability in the 17th 
Century, and Vattel following suit, Hessbregge notes that due diligence forms part of the modern 
tradition of international law.18 In the era of ‘pure inter-state’ relations due diligence found its feet 
in both the SS Lotus and the Alabama Arbitration.19 Both cases are critical in developing standards by 
which states are bound to act with due diligence and establishes how accountability flows from a 
failure to carry out legal obligations. The significance of Alabama Arbitration lies in its interpretation 
of due diligence to include private acts for which the state ought to exercise control as well as a 
relatively high proportionality standard of review. The recent ILA First Draft Report on Due Diligence 
points toward a growing recognition that questions of governance normally reserved for the 
corporate world, domestic administrative or constitutional considerations are of critically import to 
international law.20  
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Beside its academic marginality, due diligence's lack of attention stems from states’ reluctance, that 
extends to IGOs, to acknowledge the full extent of positive obligations. Positive obligations require 
actors to take active steps to ensure effective fulfilment of obligations. These positive obligations 
can incur not only financial costs but also require increased oversight to ensure that obligations are 
fully adhered to and employed. The very nature of due diligence; the assessment of harm and risk, 
requirements to notify and consult, prevention and protection, duty to investigate and reparations 
or restitution when harm has occurred, all require active steps to be taken to ensure obligations are 
fulfilled. The actual terms of due diligence remain narrow and, in many ways, ill-defined. While there 
are several quasi-judicial arbitrarial decisions referring to due diligence there is little elucidation on 
its actual content.21 Nonetheless, the effectiveness of state control, the concern to be protected, the 
predictability of potential harm and the possibility of justice highlight how due diligence ought to be 
exercised.22 As the ILA First Draft Report recognises there is acceptance that due diligence will be 
examined on an international rather than a domestic standard but also that the degree to which 
there is a common standard of due diligence across all areas remains open to debate.23    
Due diligence is both a positive obligation and an accountability mechanism, its utility in post-conflict 
conditions may be to decipher who is in control in a given situation thus determining who ought to 
exercise governance and whether the necessary steps to carry out such governance has been 
legitimately achieved. Indeed, given that these questions can be the main sticking point in periods of 
transition, identifying who possesses the positive obligations associated with due diligence, even if 
such obligations are limited, is crucial. As demonstrated elsewhere positive obligations are 
notoriously difficult to invoke by those seeking protection and freedom from governance orders.24 
Indeed, numerous economic rights debates have been caught in the quagmire of positive obligations 
whilst the language of responsibility to protect takes state’s obligations to their own citizens as their 
starting point, but beyond this there has been a failure to turn this responsibility into an obligation 
to intervene.25 
Responsibility and due diligence are closely associated but critically, remain separate charges.26 
Concentration on responsibility, particularly state responsibility, at times, masks the continual and 
evolving character of obligations attached to due diligence. Whilst often with regard to responsibility 
(whether state, IGO or individual) failures to exercise due diligence are the most apparent, positive 
duties ought to form part of planning, carrying out, enforcing and reviewing of governance activities. 
Thus, due diligence ought to be considered both before and during legal development, 
implementation, enforcement and in any proposed reform.  
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Before embarking on an examination of due diligence in post-conflict, based within the normative 
law out of which its duties and obligations emerge, it is important to tackle the values behind the 
concept. First, and probably most importantly, due diligence is divided between its public and 
private spheres. But, as with all public/private divides this serves the neat criteria of traditional 
analysis and as with all such partitions is entirely false.27 Public/private due diligence certainly 
impacts upon international law and is central to how responsibility is circumnavigated where private 
bodies perform state activities in post-conflict state-building, the role of private military contractors, 
as discussed by Sorcha McLeod in this volume, attests to this complication. Further, the 
public/private divide results in well-established negative consequences for women within a society 
masked by such partitions. Although, recently within the UN it is often with regard to women that 
due diligence is most often discussed as echoed by Aisling Swaine in her chapter.28  
Second, due diligence requires resource and capacity by whoever is exercising governance and, thus 
far, it has been interpreted along the Global North's economic preconceptions. At times, due 
diligence provides some scope for differential treatment during conflict, but this has not been 
extended to circumstances of economic or other capacity deficiencies that result in a failure to fully 
engage with the form of resource allocation mandated. While this chapter focuses on IGOs the 
requirements due diligence sets and the implications thereof ought not be underestimated. Thus, 
we need to ensure that in extending the use of due diligence, we are not simply broadening the 
Global North’s control of the governance debate to find the Global South "wanting". Such difficulties 
already play out in organisations such as the WTO where questions as to the parity of capacity to 
benefit from the institution's structures and processes are recognised.29  The implications of 
undertaking due diligence ought not to find the global legal regime focusing on, for example, African 
states, but rather recognising that the form in which due diligence has thus far been pursued is not 
without alternatives. 
Third, due diligence can be reduced to a tick-boxing exercise where procedural steps, mask 
underlying obduracy, wrongful action or assistance, wilful omission or action in the knowledge that 
it will have little positive impact or perhaps the very opposite effect of what is intended. The 
meaningfulness of a due diligence process requires a substantive system of review be maintained. 
International law is notoriously bad at carrying out review processes or even possessing bodies that 
are capable of examining the activities of other bodies. Of late, this has garnered some attention and 
small steps towards achieving some form of assurance are muted, but due diligence requires more 
than the occasional cases to ensure it is more than a tick-boxing exercise.30  
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Fourth, due diligence has its most obvious iterations in the economic context and, as such, caution 
needs to be exercised in drawing analogies. The roles of bodies such as the World Bank Group, but 
probably with more infamy, the IMF in imposing conditionality which forces post-conflict (and, at 
times, pre-conflict) states to adopt liberal economic policies such as; privatisation, the introduction 
of policies which ensure foreign investment especially in the provision of state services, the 
tendering of natural resource exploitation that inevitably end up with foreign firms with ‘capacity’, 
has often precipitated more conflict and remains deeply problematic.31 The use of private law 
conceptions of due diligence by these economic organisations continues this trend. Thus, any 
furtherance of the use of due diligence ought to take the public law conception of its operation 
rather than differentiating between its public and private use. This is of particular importance as 
international economic law is one area in which significant due diligence practice has emerged.32 
A final introductory question is what ought due diligence aim to achieve? First, it ought to be a 
method of self-regulation where IGOs and states reflect on proposed actions in post-conflict 
planning to ensure that in each area (international humanitarian, human rights and economic law) 
that they are compliant while ensuring the process is documented. Second, during the period of 
transition, however long it takes to actually achieve a form of sustainable peace, it ought to be used 
as a method of continual assessment to ensure continued compliance with obligations. Third, and 
finally, throughout the process and into the post-conflict state-building scenario, due diligence ought 
to operate as a method of holding IGOs (and states) to account for their actions at the domestic, 
regional and global levels. Due diligence threads together a variety of legal strands and ought to act 
to ensure obligations are upheld by all actors. In scenarios where IGOs fail in their due diligence 
obligations a space opens for populations under administration to question IGO legitimacy and in 
certain scenarios, reject IGO governance. 
Governance post-conflict 
The underlying legal basis of international territorial administration often emerges from the Security 
Council but can also derive from peace agreements amongst interested parties.33 These peace 
agreements, while slightly more detailed than resolutions, remain vague as to the obligations they 
impose on global actors engaged in transition. These resolutions rarely mention standards or 
positive legal obligations on which to adjudge whether IGOs act or fail to act on the basis of due 
diligence or even if this is intended by the Security Council or, if, rather it is relying on a general 
standard within international law. As the Constitutional Court of Bosnia Herzegovina stated in 2000;  
Acts by... international authorities were often passed in the name of the mandates under 
the regime of the League Nations and, in some respect, Germany and Austria after the 
Second World War. Though recognized as sovereign, the States concerned were placed 
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under international supervision, and foreign authorities acted in these States, on behalf of 
the international community, substituting themselves for the domestic authorities. Acts by 
such international authorities were often passed in the name of the States under the 
supervision... Such situation amounts to a sort of functional duality: an authority of one legal 
system intervenes in another legal system, thus making its functions dual. The same holds 
true for the High Representative: he has been vested with special powers by the 
international community and his mandate is of an international character.34 
This duality is perhaps the core difficulty in undertaking due diligence analysis in post-conflict 
situations. Where and when the duties of states and IGOs may be different or identical and, thus, 
overlap, can be entirely unclear. Nonetheless, in making such an analysis and finding parties wanting, 
a more concerted claim to reform must be proposed.35 While the idea that an IGO's ought to 
incorporate human rights obligations into their operational guidelines, policies and procedures, 
particularly when exercising governmental authority in the conduct of temporary administration 
ought to be widely accepted, utilising a due diligence methodology to achieve this has yet to be 
embedded in IGO practice. 
Ratner suggests that traditional occupations have been seen by states in terms of international 
humanitarian law, whereas IGOs favour a human rights paradigm.36 He argues that this stems from 
their different bureaucratic form (one militarised with civilian support the other civilian with military 
support) rather than a substantive legal difference. Nonetheless, as Ratner argues both are relevant 
no matter the governance form taken. Following the Nuclear Weapons Case it is clear that both 
international human rights and humanitarian law can be mutually applicable and whilst it may be 
argued that the territorial administration suggests the conflict is over and thus international 
humanitarian law (IHL) no longer applies the requirement of (foreign) military forces suggests 
otherwise.37 Further, the UN accepts the necessity of peacekeepers following IHL.38 Thus, the 
requirements of due diligence under both international humanitarian and human rights law makes it 
of wider import for those exercising governance than merely the military actors. The UN, alongside 
the World Bank Group and the IMF are also deeply engaged in economic re/construction. The 
following sections discuss the due diligence requirements in international institutional, humanitarian, 
human rights and economic law questioning whether they provide any basis for understanding due 
diligence in post conflict. 
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Due Diligence within International Institutional Law 
The role of IGOs in the administration of territory has been well documented.39 Questioning the 
roles IGOs take in the practice of due diligence particularly where these may differ from the position 
of states and thus establish new practice is significant. The ICJ affirmed in both the Reparations and 
Certain Expenses advisory opinions that an international organisation, through the attainment of 
legal personality, has responsibility.40 Yet, thus far, responsibility remains with domestic institutional 
obligations. For example, within human rights this tends toward state-based institutions being made 
available for human rights enforcement, protection and monitoring but, as Wilde argues ought to be 
viewed as also pertaining to IGOs.41 '[L]egal responsibility can be incurred if the conduct of an organ 
was based on an error of judgment which, in analogous circumstances, an administrative or 
executive authority exercising ordinary care and diligence would not have committed.'42 In addition, 
as with states, IGO's due diligence relates to questions of responsibility and implementation. Thus, 
as with state responsibility, it tends towards the reactive rather than a reflective or positive practice.  
The ILA's 2004 Report on Accountability of International Organisations makes clear links to due 
diligence and utilises both constituent documents and general international law as sources of 
accountability;  
The Committee considers that accountability of IO-s consists of three levels which are 
interrelated and mutually supportive 
-... in the fulfilment of their functions as established in their constituent instruments, 
are and should be subject to, or should exercise, forms of internal and external 
scrutiny and monitoring, irrespective of potential and subsequent liability and/or 
responsibility;  
-... liability for injurious consequences arising out of acts or omissions not involving a 
breach of any rule of international and/or institutional law ... 
- responsibility arising out of acts or omissions which do constitute a breach of a rule 
of international and/or institutional law (e.g. violations of human rights or 
humanitarian law, breach of contract, gross negligence, or as far as institutional law 
is concerned acts of organs which are ultra vires...) 43 
While due diligence and accountability are far from synonymous both are intertwined in governance. 
The steps required for accountability include both positive and negative obligations, the scrutiny and 
monitoring of acts and omissions extends to liability at both a civil (breach, negligence, ultra vires) 
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and criminal (human rights and humanitarian law) level. The ILA Report makes a specific link 
between accountability and power, but also procedural regularity. In the process of state-building, 
where IGOs exercise extensive governance powers, such accountability is at its utmost import and 
due diligence is a key element in scrutinising and recording decision-making processes.44 
The ILA Report on Accountability sets out a number of principles which forge links between states 
and IGOs. By placing responsibility with both this Report echoes the views of the Constitutional 
Court of Bosnia Herzegovina in 2000. 
1. Member States as members of an organ of an IO, and organs and agents of an IO have a 
fundamental obligation to ensure the lawfulness of actions and decisions.  
2. All organs and agents of an IO, in whatever official capacity they act, must comport 
themselves so as to avoid claims against the IO.  
3. Members of an IO have a duty to exercise adequate supervision of the IO, i.e. to ensure 
that it is operating in a responsible manner so as to protect not only their own interests but 
also that of third parties.45 
Yet, merely focusing on the avoidance of claims against the IGO is too narrow for due diligence 
requirements which necessitates positive steps to be undertaken. But the recognition of the duality 
of both the international organisation and the state governance is critical. 
Neither the Draft Articles on State Responsibility nor the Responsibility of International 
Organisations contain any direct references to due diligence but nonetheless remain relevant.46 
Significantly, both state and IGOS take responsibility as a reactionary form. Albeit, under article 2 of 
the Draft Articles, IGOs can have responsibility for both acts and omissions.47 Both sets of articles 
also focus on accountability as legal responsibility in a narrower sense than the ILA Report. But as 
with accountability, the relationship between the state and the IGOs in the forms of responsibility is 
relevant. Boon, echoing the claims to duality, argues that IGOs often rely on states to fulfil the 
requirements, but due diligence falls on both and does not act as a shield for either.48 Boon argues 
that the Draft Articles have several consequences for IGOs, two of which are relevant here. First, 
IGOs may reconsider how they define agents and their contracts and second, it 'may lead IOs not to 
act when they lack a proper mandate or funding. Especially in light of their potential legal exposure 
for omissions, IOs may avoid engaging when they cannot meet a certain standard of care or level of 
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due diligence.'49 This may be particularly important to IGOs should they embrace the state-led usage 
of private military companies as discussed in Sorcha McLeod's contribution.50  
The ILA Report on the Accountability of International Organisations makes specific reference to 
decisions regarding the use of force, peacekeeping or enforcement operations, the imposition of 
coercive measures, structural adjustment programmes and development projects during the 
temporary administration of territory in the context of international human rights and humanitarian 
law obligations.51 Interestingly, while the ILA Report does not utilise due diligence in all situations of 
accountability it does state that where there is a lack of standing mechanisms for private claimants 
against IGO's it leaves the sole route state jurisdiction, meaning accountability is lacking. Further, the 
internal local claims review boards established during peacekeeping operations are inadequate due 
to their lack of public rulings and potential for lack of independence or objectivity.52 These point to 
the difficulties which abound when points of governance remains opaque and duality continues.  
The UN has made specific due diligence recommendations regarding its own actions during post 
conflict periods. The 2013 UN Human Rights Policy on Due Diligence includes specific steps to be 
taken before providing support to non-UN forces. 53 This policy follows a similar pattern to others 
issued by IGOs by focusing on the outward facing attributes of the UN’s interaction with non-UN 
forces, albeit it requires the UN to act with due diligence and incorporates international human 
rights and humanitarian law into its obligations as well as an implementation policy. It provides that 
support be 'consistent with the purposes and principles as set out in the Charter of the United 
Nations and with its responsibility to respect, promote and encourage respect for international 
humanitarian, human rights and refugee law' while also asking that both the Security Council and 
General Assembly utilise the guidelines when either mandate action.54 The policy regards due 
diligence as risk assessment, transparency and effective implementation with more detailed 
requirements under each category.55 This policy follows the Due diligence Guidelines for the 
Responsible Supply Chain of Minerals from Red Flag Locations…Democratic Republic of the Congo 
includes a Group of Experts on due diligence.56 Both guidelines ought to be welcomed as a positive 
step in the UN's response to its positive obligations yet they remain comparatively isolated examples. 
In 2006, the Special Rapporteur on Violence Against Women its causes and consequences, openly 
criticising the reactive approach taken by states, instigated a due diligence approach to ensure 
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international human rights and humanitarian law compliance and this continues in the most recent 
report of the Special Rapporteur.57 This has also been taken up by CEDAW's Committee in General 
Recommendations No. 19, 28 and 30 though again with states and their relationship with private 
actors as their primary aim.58 Recommendation No. 30 extends exterritorial application beyond 
states when effective control is exercised re-emphasising the duality of state/IGO interactions but 
also exhorts a due diligence approach to other international human rights and humanitarian law 
obligations beyond CEDAW.59  
The Convention applies to a wide range of situations, including wherever a State exercises 
jurisdiction, such as occupation and other forms of administration of foreign territory, for 
example United Nations administration of territory; to national contingents that form part of 
an international peacekeeping or peace-enforcement operation; to persons detained by 
agents of a State, such as the military or mercenaries, outside its territory; to lawful or 
unlawful military actions in another State; to bilateral or multilateral donor assistance for 
conflict prevention and humanitarian aid, mitigation or post-conflict reconstruction; in 
involvement as third parties in peace or negotiation processes; and in the formation of trade 
agreements with conflict-affected countries60 
These institutional approaches remain ad hoc, however with due diligence obligations originating 
from state obligations rather than the recognition of institutional governance authority which has 
little or no connection to the populations over which constituted power is exercised that ought to 
necessitate its implementation.61  
International Humanitarian Law and due diligence62 
The engagement of a state's force against belligerent forces (both state and non-state) as well as 
interactions with civilian bodies within the purview of IHL requires a high level of control of the 
activities of actors under (or that ought to be) the authority of the governance power. Unlike some 
other areas IHL treaties set out specific requirements that can be characterised as due diligence. In 
the Akayesu case the Court found that Common Article 3 of Geneva Conventions (which also forms 
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part of customary international law) and Additional Protocol I & II set the minimum and 
unconditional standard of duty for states and non-state actors engaged in the use of force.63 For 
example, the 1907 Hague Convention imposes liability on states failing to exercise due diligence to 
prevent war crimes.64 Under Article 1 of the four Geneva Conventions parties undertake to ensure 
respect for the Convention in all circumstances imposing a minimum duty of due diligence whilst 
Additional Protocol I states that parties to a conflict shall be responsible for all acts committed by 
persons forming part of its armed forces. 65 
Early development of due diligence within IHL focused on the minimum standards to establish the 
responsibility of states. Thus the interaction between the law of state responsibility and IHL became 
paramount.66 Alabama Arbitration defined due diligence as in proportion to the magnitude of the 
object, dignity and strength of the power exercising it.67 It also affirmed that states have an 
obligation to take all effective measures to ensure that no harm comes to other states either in or 
from their territory.68 While this is specifically with regard to legal neutrality critically it includes 
omissions. In the Armed Activities on the Territory of Congo the ICJ held that Uganda bore the 
obligations of an occupying power, including taking 'appropriate measures to prevent the looting, 
plundering and exploitation of natural resources in the occupied territory to cover private persons in 
this district and not only members of Ugandan military forces.'69 While the line between occupation 
and territorial administration remains disputed the acceptance by the UN of the application of IHL 
would suggest this interpretation should extend to its operations.70  
Regarding non-actors fulfilling state roles during conflict, in Yeager v Iran the Tribunal found that the 
actions of private actors carrying out state functions, in the absence of regular state authorities, 
could be attributable to the State and arguably, by extension to an IGO.71 The emergence of private 
military contractors has added to the complexities of understanding due diligence in such 
circumstances. Private entities/non-state actors or individuals may violate IHL due diligence even if 
their conduct is not attributed to the state which also arguably extends to IGOs even if this is the 
shared duality of state/IGO interaction. In such instances, an IGO may incur responsibility if it is not 
diligent in pursuing and preventing acts contrary to international law by prosecuting and punishing 
private perpetrators. Yet, this does not mean that the IGO is inevitably required to exercise due 
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diligence no matter the connection to the armed group, the degree of attribution will also set the 
requirements in motion and this is likely to be more extenuated than in the examples of states. 
In the Nicaragua case the ICJ applied the ‘effective control' test.72 The ICTY in the Tadić case stated 
that in applying IHL rather than the law of state responsibility, the 'overall control test', ought to 
apply.73 Following this reasoning, once overall control was established the state would have to act 
with due diligence and thus take positive steps to assess harm and risk, to notify and consult, to 
prevent and protect, to investigate and to grant reparations or restitution when harm has occurred. 
In the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of Genocide the ICJ rejected the ICTY's position and 
returned to 'effective control'. 74  This disagreement is significant as it determines in what 
circumstances a state, and in practice an IGO, ought to exercise due diligence regarding non-state 
actors. 
IHL's relationship to international criminal law is also significant. The Permanent Court of Arbitration 
in the British Claims in the Spanish Zone of Morocco found due diligence requirements to prevent 
and punish the unlawful acts of armed groups.75 While in the Essen Lynching Trial the Court found 
that the failure to protect allied prisoners of war from aggressive mobs fell below the required 
standard.76 In the Akayesu case the Court found that Article 4 of the ICTR Statute in combination 
with violations of Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions and Additional Protocol I & II did no 
set persons to be prosecuted therefore the relationship to the state was not necessarily a 
prohibition to prosecution but rather the duty of the state to provide minimum protection to those 
covered was the basis on which due diligence operated.77 Whilst these cases addressed states, it is 
arguable they apply equally to IGOs, if in a somewhat modified form.  
Common Article 3 and other elements of IHL are certainly part of customary international law and so 
too the due diligence requirements that accompany them. As the ICRC argues '[g]iven that 
multinational forces are more often than not deployed in conflict zones it becomes essential to 
determine when a situation is an armed conflict in which IHL will constitute an additional legal 
framework governing a specific operation' and so too, due diligence. 78 
Due Diligence and international human rights79 
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Since its inception international human rights has focused on states, though as we have already seen 
with regard to IHL and below with regard to economic law, human rights do play a role in how IGOs 
also regard their obligations.80 Unlike economic law, due diligence as a term of art is less engaged, 
with the exception of CEDAW and the Special Rapporteur on Violence against Women, but 
nonetheless a similar remit of both positive and negative obligations are present. As within IHL, 
international human rights due diligence does not require the actor engaged in the breach to be the 
state or one of its actors.81 At a very basic level, human rights which are also jus cogens norms 
necessarily have the strictest obligations and are binding upon IGOs but other rights which form part 
of customary international law are also relevant.82 
The UN has issued a limited number of specific human rights policies on due diligence. For example 
the Human Rights Council Protect, Respect and Remedy Framework in 2008 incorporates civil, 
political, economic, social and cultural rights, and includes the right to development which is 
particularly significant in the economic law framework. 83 Yet, the policy entirely targets states and 
corporations undertaking human rights due diligence and thus is outward looking rather than 
examining the UN's own due diligence in these matters. With regard to the specifics of women's 
rights, here again, the UN has been more outward looking than internally examining its own 
practices which given the limited role of women in leadership positions at the UN is problematic. As 
previously mentioned the Special Rapporteurs on Violence Against Women uses due diligence to 
assure observance and, when this does not occur, to criticise the ever-present reactive approaches.84 
Yet, these examples are characterised by an IGO exhortation of states to take up due diligence in 
their human rights application both also require that states ensure that this occurs when non-state 
actors take actions which could include organisations of which they are members thus using the 
duality to extend due diligence obligations. 
As the ILA Report of Due Diligence remarks, it is with regard to economic and social rights that due 
diligence has had its most traction, but civil and political rights and third generation rights are as 
relevant in scenarios of state-building and territorial administration. Due diligence requirements are 
interpreted by the bodies created by the treaties, whose remit is thus limited to review of state's 
activities, as for example the CEDAW example mentioned earlier. Other than clear customary legal 
obligations it has been up to the IGOs to adopt a human rights framework and thus due diligence 
into their activities. Thus far this has not been done with any great enthusiasm with the possible 
limited exception of the UN in Kosovo which contained the UN Third Party Claims Process, the 
Kosovo Ombudsman, the Kosovo Human Rights Advisory Panel that investigates potential violations 
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of human rights by UNMIK and the ICCPR Human Rights Committee Reports on Kosovo though this 
latter example has been filtered through Serbia's state obligations.85 The Kosovo Human Rights 
Advisory Panel has suffered by being a creation of the body it investigates and thus is subject to 
UNMIK's decision to restrict its parameters. 86 In addition, the plethora of bodies investigating the 
actions of an IGO in a relatively small geographical area in an almost totally reactive fashion 
illustrates the limited character of human rights due diligence during territorial administration. 
In respect of civil and political rights, the duty to prevent acts of cruel, inhuman or degrading 
treatment, the duty to investigate disappearances at the hands of non-state actors and to respect 
and ‘ensure’ individuals enjoy their civil and political rights in general and have access to effective 
remedies imply the necessity of a standard of due diligence in the guise of investigation, prosecution, 
reparations or restitution, depending on the situation. In the post-conflict setting it would also 
require IGOs to fully consider the context of their administration rather than merely taking a 'one-
size fits all approach' that entirely relies on reactive due diligence to remedy violations. In regard to 
economic and social rights terms such as ‘all appropriate measures’ to ‘achieve progressively’ the 
rights enables a use of due diligence to ensure certain steps are taken, progress is reviewed and 
substantive progress made.87  
Whilst this has largely been state focused, as with IHL the interrelationship and duality between a 
state's implementation and that of an IGO when both are in a governance position within a 
particular site opens both to claims when due diligence obligations have not been fulfilled and there 
is a dual responsibility for rights violations. In sum, with regard to international human rights, while 
there is some due diligence practice it is largely reactive and does not appear to be part of the 
overarching approach to implementing human rights into IGO operations.  
Due Diligence and International Economic Law 
Due diligence found a natural home within private commercial transactions, but regarding the 
activities of international economic actors such as the World Bank Group or the IMF, who are often 
engaged in different stages of the pre and post conflict scenarios, the requirements of due diligence 
are less obvious. The notion of the 'right to development' is critical here, specifically regarding the 
methods by which these organisations go about achieving this during post-conflict situations.88 The 
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question becomes what due diligence standards ought these organisations hold themselves to when 
engaging in post-conflict states particularly those under territorial administration.89 
Both the IMF and World Bank Group deploy due diligence in their agreements with states and the 
conditionality they impose. The peculiar character of these "letters of intent" or memorandums of 
understanding that both the IMF and World Bank Group set with states means that despite 
appearing to be treaties they are not, thus review of the obligations created therein is difficult.90 The 
financial implications of states not following their content may impact on their ability/willingness to 
comply with other obligations particularly economic and social rights.91 Both the formulations of 
agreements with the World Bank Group and IMF as well as the form of economic system established 
during the territorial administration is critical, as with other IGOs, due diligence tends to have an 
outward rather than inward and reflective focus. Thus, while these institutions require states to take 
due diligence into their practice in an outward fashion this is not replicated within the organisations. 
Solomon links human rights and particularly the right to development and attributes these 
obligations to the World Bank, the IMF and the WTO while also critiquing their lack of fulfilment.92 
Within the IMF the most obvious use of due diligence is the instigation of a safeguards assessment. 
The aim of these is to protect the IMF's investment and guarantee the repayment of loans by 
ensuring a client state's central bank's governance is at the necessary standard. These safeguards 
require external audit mechanisms, legal structures and autonomy, financial reporting, internal audit 
mechanisms and a system of internal controls.93 These due diligence procedures extend into 
processes to ensure that policies on Longer Term Programme Engagement include in ensuring a 
state maintains its economic reforms and if anything in post-conflict scenarios are stricter than for 
other states.94 Under its Articles of Agreement the IMF must establish adequate safeguards to 
ensure that loans are repaid and this is a duty the IMF owes to its own members, but this has largely 
has been interpreted as outward facing.95 All contemporary agreements with states contain due 
diligence provisions that also form part of the reviews of states' implementation. The creation of the 
Independent Evaluation Office in 2001 to appraise the IMF goes someway to introducing a due 
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diligence review of the organisation that while welcome, and perhaps is more significant than any 
UN attempts to evaluate its own work, still leaves the organisation with a relatively open hand.96 
The World Bank's constituent organisations take a pro-active approach to due diligence, but as with 
the IMF this is largely state focused. For instance, as part of its due diligence process the 
International Financial Corporation (IFC) in facilitating investment examines the 'environmental and 
social risks and opportunities' in a company's process of investing including corruption and fraud but 
also human rights impact assessments.97 The World Bank Group also requires environmental impact 
assessments and have a due diligence checklist for aspects such as public-private partnerships.98 As 
with the IMF, the World Bank constituent organisations are also bound by its Articles of Agreement 
to adequately safeguard its resources and have taken this as paramount in the conditionality they 
extend. 
Yet, how the requirements of the Articles of Agreements are to be achieved or adjudged could be 
broader than a strict monetary assessment. 99 Whilst, for example, the World Bank Group adopts 
some human rights based principles into its activities, as with the UN, this has largely been an 
outward focus rather than a process where it incorporates due diligence standards into its own 
institutional operation. What is critical about these forms of due diligence assessment is that while 
uniquely they are requirements of their own founding agreements, aiming to safeguard their 
resources, there is some leeway as to how this protection is to be achieved. Taking a holistic 
approach to their Articles of Agreement, particularly their creation in the post-conflict scenario of 
World War II, the clear link between development, economic stability and peace could be taken to 
require a balancing of the necessity to safeguard resources and while also attaining economic 
development that contributes to peace. This would require both an active and reactive approach to 
these obligations that a due diligence methodology would appear to support. 
The impact of economic policies driven by multilateral bodies has been documented elsewhere as 
have the impact of sanctions regimes overseen by the UN and regional bodies upon local 
populations.100 In the aftermath of conflict the imposition of particular economic policies have been 
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evident in state-led operations such as in Iraq or Bosnia where loans are secured by the IMF or 
World Bank during occupation and while governance is exercised by IGOs.101 When a governance 
mandate includes economic development it is questionable whether this requires the instigation of a 
particular form of economic order generally based upon a liberal economics.102 This is particularly 
problematic when economic concerns were part of the actual spiral into violent conflict as in 
Yugoslavia, Haiti or Rwanda. As Solomon attests '[w]orld poverty is also attributable to the existing 
global system, elements of which by design, cause and/or fail to remedy this widespread 
deprivation' and this forms part of the conflict narrative.103 
Conclusion 
Multilateralism has brought distinct changes to the operation of international law and due diligence 
is an excellent example of this evolution. Yet the development of multilateralism makes it critical to 
reflect upon what due diligence adds to governance, particularly when there is no constituent link 
between the population in a territory and the governance authority in place. Where there is dual 
authority how power is exercised ought to be subject to law's scrutiny. The chaos of illegitimacy that 
often leads to conflict cannot be resolved in the post-conflict scenario, if those in governance insist 
on the due diligence of those emerging from conflict but not upon themselves. IGOs have both the 
experience as well as the human and monetary resources, often lacking in post-conflict states, that 
enables some foresight which would identify issues likely to arise as a result of their intervention and 
the post-conflict scenario. A due diligence approach would enable them to take an active approach 
that would perhaps forestall some of the reactive actions that have been taken in places such as 
Kosovo or Bosnia. 
Thus far IGOs have largely taken an outward facing approach to due diligence. The UN, World Bank 
Group and the IMF all acknowledge the international humanitarian, human rights and economic law 
obligations establish due diligence requirements. Yet, in the majority of instances IGOs regard these 
requirements as necessary for state compliance rather than their own governance activities. This is a 
particular imperative when states are emerging from conflict, when their own capacity to ensure 
compliance with their international legal obligations is probably minimal. A failure by IGOs to engage 
with due diligence would justifiably enable post-conflict states to question the legitimacy of IGO 
governance.  
The establishment of Ombudspersons, Panels and Evaluation Offices by the UN, IMF or World Bank 
Group are positive steps, but again, these are reactive and thus a further reliance on the 
responsibility arm of due diligence rather than the proactive and long-term processes that are 
necessary. Positive obligations are due during transition and peace-building. The lack of participation 
by the local population in choosing their governance combined with the duality of governance 
between states and IGOs makes due diligence all the more critical as without it violations will simply 
fall between the cracks of unclaimed authority. In the post-conflict situation and beyond, as a 
method of self-regulation, of continued re-evaluation of compliance with international legal 
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obligations and as a tool of accountability IGOs must engage with due diligence beyond requiring it 
of states. 
